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Never felt to be a natural catastrophe, AIDS has from the start carried the traits of an his- 
torical event. If AIDS had been comprehensible only in terms of natural calamity, it would 
not have called for a critique: you cannot throw a critique at an earthquake, nor could you 
really complain about the pounding waves of the ocean, not even if you were inclined to 
view it, through Bataille's pineal eye, as the earth's continual jerking off. But catastrophe, 
folded over by traits of historical if not conventional markings, calls for a critique, it 
demands a reading. 
I started writing about the catastrophe at a time, now difficult to imagine, when even 
the acronym, AIDS, was not acknowledged by the Reagan White House to exist either in 
official or common language usage. The collapse of rumour and disease control was con- 
siderable; it was thought, in the obscure ages of the Reagan presidency, that to allow the 
word to circulate freely would in itself encourage the referential effects of naming to spread. 
There is nothing very new about language policies that try radically to abbreviate the itin- 
erary of the rumour thought to be CO-originary with the spreading velocities of disease. 
Defoe's Journal of a Plague would supply one among numerous examples of the way lan- 
guage is seen to be, as they now say, a virus. Ever since the original Reagan ban on the 
word (however repressed or forgotten this initial "response" may be), a politics of contain- 
ment and border patrol has dominated the way this culture looks at AIDS. On a level of far 
lesser consequence, AIDS has not yet acquired the status of an object worthy of scholarly 
solicitude. Looking back, we can understand why there was such resistance (evidenced by 
the political and linguistic behaviour of straights and gays alike) to admitting the epidemic 
into the rarefied atmosphere of academic inquiry: AIDS infeced the academy, dissolving 
boundaries that traditionally set the disciplines off from one another, if only to secure their 
sense of self-knowledge. I t  is small wonder that conservative literary critics, and those 
generally concerned by questions of history and reference, initially deplored the inclusion 
of this "outside" referent, which by its very existence, challenged the purity of institutional 
divisions. When it did come about, the study of AIDS encouraged the emergence of new, 
marginal and "deviant" areas of inquiry in the humanities: gender studies, gay studies, 
queer theory, multicultural networks, mutant French theory, and even computer-based 
cyberpunk speculations. 
My need to write about AIDS was originally motivated by a number of considerations, 
each felt by me to be as urgent as the next: my close friend, Marc Paszamant, was among 
the earliest victims that AIDS had claimed; an entire community was soon to follow; I was 
anxious over the ways in which the event of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome was 
being consistently put under erasure; the syndrome appeared to intensify the culpabiliza- 
tion of minorities and the social margin; finally, those who were called upon to investigate 
the seemingly originary pathogenesis were being guided by uninterrogated metaphysical 
assumptions concerning its constitution. The first of these assumptions understood AIDS 
to derive from one cause, and this cause was reduced to a virus. Secondly, the methodolo- 
gies used to interpret the syndrome involved codes of research that depended upon the 
old news of a hidden matrix of signification and an absent centre of meaning from which 
the truth was ostensibly pulsing in secrecy. Finally, those who had the funding and author- 
ity to study AIDS gave little consideration to the likelihood that the mutation of this virus 
- if it was a matter principally of virology - owes its existence to a multiplicity of factors, 
which locate it in our age of technological dominion, social inequity and inwardly turned 
violence. The resistance to admitting the multifactoral aggregate which is responsible for 
AIDS, and the collective impulse to "isolate" a single cause, seemed due to a lack of a judi- 
cious construal of derivation. The sustained fabrication of autoimmune laboratories in 
our polity seemed worthy of consideration as well; i.e., the protocols by which the United 
States was beginning systematically to turn weaker forces into contained spaces of internally 
discharged violence (of which the drug wars, or more locally, South Central Los Angeles are 
indisputable signs). 
A genealogist - or anyone, for that matter, including the scientific "community," who 
knows something about the way science legitimates its procedures - must readily grant 
the possibility that the phenomenon submitted to study is routinely framed by theoretical 
assumptions, the reliability of which may be only partial. While we in the West are no 
longer restricted, in principle, in our thoughts by the divine monopoly that dominated 
medieval medicine (when doctors and theologians were one, and the plague, for example, 
was seen to originate in those carriers that were recognized, after much research, as Jews), 

I find it  curious that AIDS, for all the discontinuities and anomalies it reflects, nonetheless 
leaves untouched the tradition by which epidemics come to be associated with minorities 
including, nowadays, the greater part of the so-called Third World. In fact, the culpabi- 
lization of minorities was 'grounded" once and for all in the twentieth century in the way 
we have permitted ourselves to think about the uncontrolled proliferation of AIDS. In one 
of his works, I can't remember which, Heidegger said that an error in thinking could mess 
us up for hundreds of years to come. I suspect that our inability to read AIDS constitutes 
such an error in an already overdrawn historical account. If this remark may seem exces- 
sive, it is only so to the degree that excess is constitutive of thinking; however, given the 
gravity of the subject, I consider these observations to be an exercise in understatement. 
In any case, I have tried to demonstrate in another article1 how the inability to read AIDS 
has spread to the body politic, where the Persian Gulf war, as the phantasm of a safe and 
bloodless intervention, becomes the symptom par excellence for the uncontrolled transla- 
tion of the syndrome into other bodies which feel the need to achieve HIV negative test 
results in a world historical theatre. But the failure to read AIDS is not reducible to a sim- 
ple power failure or strategy of avoidance: it is bequeathed to us by the Western logos. 
In the trajectory that some of my work has tried to follow, the appearance of AIDS con- 
stitutes a crucial figure in the technological disclosure, while it also disarticulates any 
claim to subjective recuperation.2 As it underscores the essential relationship between 
testing and technology, AIDS, for us, has made clear the notion that no technology exists 
that will not be tested; additionally, however, AIDS has shed light on the way our moder- 
nity has technologized the subject into a testable entity under state control. An effect of 
technology, AIDS is part of the radical destructuration of social bonds that will have been 
the legacy of the twentieth century. It is a bit of a platitude to observe that every epidemic 
is a product of its time; but the CO-factors that have produced the destruction of internal 
self-defence capabilities still need to be studied in a mood of Nietzschean defiance toward 
the metaphysico-scientific establishment. For surely AIDS is in concert with the homolo- 
gous aggression that is widely carried out against the weak within the ensemble of politi- 
cal, cultural and medical procedures. It is not far-fetched to observe that these procedures 
take comparable measures to destroy any living, menacing reactivity, and thus have to be 
considered precisely in terms of the disconcerting reciprocity of their ensemble. 
If AIDS appears to us as an event within history, or even as an historial event, this means 
that it cannot be seen, as a misfortune, to come from elsewhere; it comes from man. 
Situated within the limits of a history gone bad, revealing its infirmity, AIDS for us does 
not come from God. But because it is not (yet) curable, it is perceived as a kind of self- 
destruction of a society abandoned to its own immanence.3 The renewed experience of 
God's mute complicity or historical withdrawal ("God" is to be understood here as a 
promissory transcendence capable of forgiving debts and healing) explains in part why 
AIDS is a peculiarly buman symptom, functioning as the locus of a suicidal impulse that 
increasingly determines our species. AIDS is the affair of man at the end of the millennium; 
it is "about" man's self-annihilating toxic drive and his scorn for the figure of humanity as 
it has been disclosed. A sign of the failure of man's custodianship, AIDS is the end of the 
credit line humanity thought it could have with some form of transcendence. 
While AIDS displays historial qualities, it should not be temporally confused with 
absolute emergence. "The brutal appearance of an epidemic, within a set of multifactoral 
conditions that have evolved gradually, depends upon a quantitative threshold of emer- 
gence," cautions Michel Bounan in his critically important work, Le temps du sida.4 In 
effect, this epidemic should not be viewed as sudden, epochal appearance but as a culmi- 
nation in the history of a debilitating milieu of forces, the effects of which underscore 
the turning of a humanity rigorously set against itself. Dr. Bounan has written a treatise 
deploring life-despising medicine; or, in other equally Nietzschean terms (though he does 
not himself articulate these terms), his scientific invective against the current state of AIDS 
research discloses the medicalization of ressentiment in our time. Indeed, it would be neces- 
sary to see the extent to which resentful medicine (for example, those branches of modern 
medicine that are servile to the dictatorship of pharmaceutical companies) is CO-responsible, 
together with those effects of capital and technology to which we owe the degradation of 
the environment, for the increase in infectious and tumoral disease. The manifest inability 
to question the entire apparatus of theoretical presuppositions under which research has 
been conducted (cancer remains incomprehensible, AIDS confounds them absolutely) leads 
one to wonder whether this paralysis is not symptomatic of the paranoid condition typi- 
fied in all epochs anticipating the end of civilization. 
Medical science has been reluctant to ask the critical question: What are the multifac- 
toral conditions for the possibility of this epidemic? The motivation behind the failure to 
ask is no doubt related to the narcissistically defended boundaries that scientific research 
has lacked the courage to cross. Though dominated by a logic of invasion and interven- 
tion, medical science halts its investigations on this side of a diagnostic ethics. Still bound 
by laws of causality and isolationist views of the phenomenon to be studied, medicine is 
equally beholden to the idiom of a limited polemological approach. There is probably 
nothing outrageous about mapping the body as an intensive conflictual site where war is 
continually being waged, for example, by one cell or another. And yet the strategies of 
attack that have been charted appear (despite high-tech manipulation) to rely upon the 
premises of resentful medicine for their insight. 
Still pre-Nietzschean in the strategic mapping of disease, medical science unfailingly 
favours "conquering" symptoms by means of violent interventions. According to Bounan, 
medical science should seek to diminish pathogenic aggressions rather than adding to 
them; it should intensify defensive reaction rather than suppress it; and it should let dis- 
ease follow its course rather than "vanquishing" it - for, the paradigms of absolute defeat 
are moored in phantasms of militaristic conquest. Diseases are not provoked by a patho- 
genic environment that would be merely destructive, but against it, by a patient who is 
defending herself. These immunopathological actions directed against the pathogenic envi- 
ronment constitute efforts to conserve life. Illnesses are the "natural defence" of the living 
and not a message from the dead, which is in effect the only object of biological research. 
(Bounan demonstrates how biology, a misnomer, can interpret only what is dead and can 
never come to furnish, therefore, an understanding of the living.) Science has to ask itself 
what life is - a question, if not increasingly politicized, then at least problematized by 
technologies of reproduction and life extension - and what is foreign to life. The immuni- 
tary apparatus, the natural terminator of foreign formations, has itself become foreign. 
Modern medicine's principal pride consists of the antimicrobial war it has waged, which 
focuses on foreign productions. This war has mandated that vaccinations be globally 
deployed, an action that has contributed to massive resections affecting the living totality 
of reactional coherency. These interventions are CO-responsible for ulterior pathologies. Is 
it a mere coincidence that the African AIDS epidemic followed upon a program of massive 
vaccination? Did not the introduction of vaccination in Africa, despite all good intentions, 
contribute to the destruction of the reactional coherency of indigenous communities, serv- 
ing only to weaken their resolve to defend themselves within and outside their political 
bodies? In short, what sort of an aggression does mass inoculation imply, what kinds of 
shots are being administered to "pacify" the West's other? As Bounan observes, "A disease 
appears when an ensemble of 'homologous' aggressions, simultaneously physical and cli- 
matic, alimentary and toxic, microbial and emotional, self-induce a defensive mechanism, 
reaching a lesional threshold."> Whether or not Western medicine was forcing upon 
Africans an internalization of Ge-stell (technological posure or framing), by injection, it 
is no exaggeration to say that Africa was invaded medically, just as doctors on the equally 
"moral" side are assisting, via injection, in the administration of capital punishment in 
America - an absolute perversion of their responsibilities. 
On  the one hand, medicine is answerable for its reluctance to read the decisive cuts it 

has made in understanding theoretical assumptions which support uninterrogated research 
habits; on the other hand, it must be made responsible for the effectivity, whether con- 
sciously or unconsciously conceived, of its own interventions. If diagnosis were truly to 
become what it is, it would have to respond to the reactional, if not revolutionary, exigency 
of discovery in relation to mutation. The censorship exercised by the medical community 
and the punitive measures taken by the National Institutes of Health against virologist 
Peter Duesberg is a case in point. When he proposed the theory that HIV is unrelated to 
AIDS, arguing that AZT (one of the few government-approved AIDS prevention and treatment 
drugs) constitutes a powerful poison which itself causes the body's immune system to col- 
lapse and can instigate full-blown AIDS, Duesberg was defunded - a fact which interests 
me only to the extent that it serves as an example of the insistence upon strict viral causal- 
ity and the corresponding reluctance to explore the homologous aggressions to which AIDS 
must be linked. Just as etiological, lesional or psychiatric treatments can be justly regarded 
as dubious interventions, so too must the "precise cause" of a disease be understood as a 
trap.6 I t  cannot be denied that the genuine treatment of AIDS would require us to risk over- 
turning those pathological ideologies and metaphysical deceits which continue to domi- 
nate the world to this day. On the rise, suicide, anguish, poverty, and epidemics sign off 
the immanence of the one-on-one, pitting humanity against itself - a humanity steadily 
abandoned by the promise of future or exteriority and barely able to go over its multifac- 
toral histories. 
The problem with writing a timely or topical essay is that, as the surfaces of interpretabil- 
ity shift with time, adjustments come to be made in the research whose immobility one 
had deplored. This is a risk that accrues to such histories, one that I take knowing that 
it exposes my writing to the brutal exigency of a finite here-and-now. Perhaps tomorrow 
what I here understand as ressentimental medicine will have vindicated itself and transvalu- 
ated the meaning of its strategic interventions. If the effort to renew a commitment to the 
Nietzschean critique of science seems at once to reflect its own anachrony (lagging behind 
the event it seeks to understand), and to expose a symptom of excessive timeliness, my read- 
ing was also, from the start, untimely and even strangely cheerful. The example of Mozart 
read by Nietzsche that I used several years ago was meant to show how the Magic Flute, 
Mozart's final opera, attended by the young composer on his death bed, unconsciously pro- 
jected the drama of immunodeficiency (Tamino was transmuted into "Contamino," to 
whom the Queen of the Night had relinquished the immunocompetent object, the flute- 
phallus, and so forth). The status of this example, while no doubt pointing to an instance 
of scandalous achronicity, as regards the imperious urgency of the present, for which AIDS 
is an unsubstitutable sign, nonetheless implies that while AIDS is a singular event, its fun- 
damental structures of defensive disintegration are also, as Mirko Grmek has subsequently 
argued, part of a much longer history.' Understood solely in terms of its epidemiological 
dimensions, AIDS is an altogether new phenomenon. According to Grmek, moreover, 
the biological and social conditions of the past have prevented the full emergence of the 
particular circuitry to be followed by a retrovirus which would so relentlessly attack the 
immune system. An epidemic of such disastrous proportions could not have taken place, 
he argues, prior to the liberalization of morals combined with the control exercised in 
modern medicine by means of the technology of intravenous injections and blood transfu- 
sions. "But this epidemiological fact does not necessarily imply that the retrovirus in 
question is a newcomer in the absolute sense of the term - a mutant whose ancestors were 
never pathogenic."9 Our task, as genealogists, requires us to read how this syndrome, with 
its peculiar idiom of latency and invisibility, has activated autodestruct triggers to become 
the effect of what Grmek calls, perhaps too briefly, the consummate "metaphor of our 
time" - linked as it is to drugs, sexuality, blood, high-tech and to the condition which 
allows for the recrudescence, one again comfortably couched in scientific language, of the 
culpabilization of minorities. 
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